a negative consumption tax designed to lower the market priceand presumably increase the consumptionof some good or service. The total impact of subsidies can be adequately considered only in the context of the whole fiscal system, but I shall assume that governments have the choice between the payment of income supplements to those unable to afford a minimum level of basic needs, while leaving their provision to the market, and the subsidisation (including the free provision) of the goods and services which it includes in the list of basic needs. In this comparison, I take the fiscal system as given.
The case for subsidies as compared with direct financial subventions can be summarised as follows:
The social cost of the additional consumption made possible by the subsidy may be less than the benefit derived from the additional consumption which it makes possible. Thus the cost of admitting more patients to an underutilised hospital may be very small. This is of course the principle behind marginal cost pricing, and is especially applicable to 'lumpy' types of investment.
Markets for the provision of basic needs may not work well. Potential consumers may be badly informed. Thus a system of relying on the market for the provision of education or health services will favour middle-class familieswho will have the information required to choose between various types of provisionover poor familieswho may not. Because of monopoly or other market imperfections, the supply of basic commodities may be inadequate or expensive. If the problem is one of monopoly, however, governments could in principle provide the goods or services concerned at less than the market price but without any subsidy. Monopoly or imperfect competition may justify government intervention; they do not necessarily justify subsidies.
External benefits may arise from greater consumption of the good or service concerned than would occur at market prices. Thus the whole community may stand to gain if individual ill-health is reduced. The elimination of malnutrition may increase output, and the benefit of at least part of this increase will accrue to the community (e.g. through the fiscal system).
A system of direct financial aids to people below some basic minimum would necessitate arrangements for selecting those entitled to benefit, and deciding on its extent. A selective system of this kind involves problems of accessand may indeed yield greater benefits to those involved in administering the system than to the intended beneficiaries. Subsidies, however, could be non-selective, and may therefore not involve questions of access. They could thus be more cost-effective than direct income supplements. Income supplements may involve problems of the distribution of consumption within families. If additional income is made available to the head of the family, it may not go to increase the consumption of those in most neede.g. pregnant or nursing women, or pre-school children. Through the subsidisation and distribution of commodities (especially foodstuffs) it may be possible to direct aid to those in most need. This argument is, however, inconsistent with the case against direct income supplements. Poor people would spend additional income on the 'wrong' things'unnecessary' consumption (weddings, drink, non-nutritious food) rather than 'basic needs'--i.e. poor people have a high income elasticity of demand for 'non-basic' goods and services.
Alternatively, it is argued that, in a capitalist system, poor consumers are persuaded to buy things that they do not really 'need'. Government can correct these distortions by subsidising or freely distributing those goods and services which enter into basic needs. This last argument assumes that 'officials', 'politicians' or 'experts' are better informed about poor people's basic needs than are the poor themselves. Indeed it calls into question the whole concept of basic needs. Are basic needs definable by experts, or by the poor themselves? If we accept that wants are socially determined, is determination by government 'better' than determination through the market? in Pigou's words (1952 :759) "it is a very delicate matter for the State to determine authoritatively in what way poor people shall distribute scanty resources amoiig various competing needs". These arguments (which are familiar from the public finance literature) clearly have different weights.
Many who would accept the case based on monopoly, external benefits, or lack of appropriate information, might doubt that the poor are more stupid than experts or bureaucrats. But even if not entirely 3' accepted, these arguments clearly have sonic force. We need, however, to consider in rather more detail who are likely to be the actual beneficiaries of subsidies. To illustrate the problems, I shall consider subsidies on basic foodstuffs.
Food subsidies take many forms. They may be subsidies to farmers; most of their benefit accrues to growers who obtain higher prices for their products than they would without subsidies, consumer prices being little affected. We shall assume that the immediate benefit of the subsidy accrues to consumers consumer prices are lowered by the full amount of the subsidy. This will clearly be so where the subsidised food is distributed free or where it is imported and he importing country is too small to influence world prices. The distribution of benefit will depend on three factorsthe identity of the purchasers or recipients of the subsidised foodstuffs, the effect of the subsidy on wage rates, and the effects on employment.
Food subsidies may be selective or generalthat is, subsidised food may be made available to particular groups (as in food aid projects) or may be generally on sale. Thus there may be schemes to distribute free or cheap food to 'vulnerable groups', or for free school meals to be provided. Again, food subsidies may be associated with a rationing scheme so as to ensure that large or industrial consumers do not benefit unduly. Again, the types of food being gubgidiged may be those mainly consumed by the poor. Thus subsidised rice in Mauritius is normally of a quality which is not bought by the rich.
In principle, food subsidies should he selective if they are to be of direct help to the poor. But there are several qualifications to this simple formula.
First, the proportion of total expenditure on basic food (e.g. cereals) by poor people is greater than that by rich people. A non-selective subsidy on such foods will therefore he of far greater relative benefit to the poor than to the rich. Moreover, since by far the greater part of the population in most developing countries is poor and (above a certain income level) the price and income elasticity of demand for basic foodstuffs is low, most of the increased food consumption stimulated by a general subsidy on such foods will be by the poor. For middle class families such a non-selective subsidy will amount to a general income supplement--il will release purchasing power for additional expenditure elsewhere.
Second, a deliberately selective system will involve some means of identifying beneficiaries. Such systenis involve similar problems of access and exclusion to those already referred to as affecting minimum income support schemes.
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In addition, sime types of selective system may be inherently biased against the poorest people. Thus school meals benefit only children in school: if children from the poorest families or areas do not go to school they will not benefit. This is not to argue against school meals: they may have various favourable external effects--encouraging more children to come to school, or increasing the alertness of children in their studies. But one should be aware of such unintended bias.
So far I have argued that although, in principle, food subsidies to the poor should be selective, even a nonselective system of subsidies on basic foodstuffs may help them. But a subsidy of less than 100 per cent will be of help1 only to those who have some cash income.
Below a certain income level, the subsidy will be regressive, and the actual direct impact then will depend on the extent of the subsidy and the distribution of income.
The principal potential indirect effect of food subsidies is on the wage level. If wages are at subsistence level, lowering the cost of subsistence
In so far as food subsidies reduce wages, what effect do they have on employment? The case for the use of food subsidies to promote employment was put in the Meade Report (Meade et al, 1968) on Mauritius:
wage rates should be kept stable, so that automatically in the search for low costs producers and employers (governmental as well as private) will have an incentive, whenever there is a choice, to introduce new products and processes which involve the use of labour rather than the use of capital and land. .. But a policy involving wage restraint does not mean that there can be no measures taken over the coming years to improve standards of living . . . The subsidisation of the cost of living is a. . . way in which the standard of living of the worker can be supported without any direct raising of labour costs". One issue here, as the report recognised, is how far food subsidies actually do act as a restraint on increases in money wage levels, and if they do, what the impact of such wage reductions is on employment.
It would be simplistic to suggest that there is a clear and direct relation between wage levels and employment. The structure of wages and salaries (e.g. as between urban and rural occupations, white collar and other jobs) may be as important as their overall in many activities techniques appear to be virtually given by the equipment and machinery available on world markets. But in many countries the cost of imported capital equipment is undoubtedly lowered by the existence of cheap foreign exchange, tax treatment of investment, and cheap loans. In so far as such practices favour capital-intensive operations and products, a policy of wage restraint could do something to correct the resulting distortions. All this suggests that, in certain circumstances, food subsidies could help employment. The relation between the two is, however, uncertain. Indeed, if a government wishes to subsidise employment, it might do so more effectively through direct wage subsidies than by the indirect means of food subsidies.
Can the argument based on food subsidies be extended to other, widely used types of subsidy on such basic needs as housing, water and education? How effective are such subsidies in the meeting of these needsand in particular the needs of the poorest citizens? Such subsidies may raise problems of a different kind from those involved in food subsidies. For example, the income elasticity of demand for many of these other servicesnotably education and housingis far greater than that for basic foodstuffs. Even with a service such as water, we may assume that rich people have more appliances than poor people, and will therefore consume more. Moreover, if loans for house building or purchase are subsidised through the tax system, the beneficiaries will be those at the top end of the income tax scale, buying or building the most expensive houses. Middle class families may be able to gain access to the best schools for their childreneven in a system where access to such schools is in theory through competitive examinations. Thus unselective subsidies on such goods and services are likely to be regressive and their cost-effectiveness in terms of meeting basic needs will be poor. What strategies are available for the use of subsidies in such situations? First, subsidies can be made selective. But this entails the sacrifice of one of the main potential advantages of subsidies over income supplementation. Selectively subsidised housing implies the creation of a privileged group who benefit from the subsidy as against the mass of the people who do not. Access to the subsidised service becomes a tradeable commodityand has value in the hands of those who control its supply. Secondly, selection can be effected implicitly by the provision or subsidisation of goods and services consciously intended to be 'inferior' in some sense to those demanded by the rich. Thus schools, medical services and so on may be provided on a 'pauper' level for the poor, the rich being encouraged to make their own provision. This is a common strategy, but there are clear social objections to it. Thirdly, pricing systems may provide for a measure of cross-subsidisation between rich and poor. Thus water charges may allow for an initial supply of free or cheap water for small consumers, with rising marginal charges for large consumers. Such systems are practicable (and indeed used) oniy where the measurement of consumption is simple. Moreover, they do not solve the problem of access; those who have no supply will not be subsidised, and at the lower end of the scale, such a system may be regressive.
There is thus no completely satisfactory system for subsidising goods and services with a high income ela'sticity of demand. In the last resort, any fair system would involve means tests. And in many countries such tests have the effect of excluding those in most need.
The regressive impact of certain subsidies has drawn attention to the possibility of using income supplements as an alternative means of providing basic needs. If the basic needs' of the poor could be provided if only they had sufficient income to pay for them, direct income supplements would have several advantages over subsidies. They would permit a greater range of choice to their recipients; they would deliberately exclude all but the neediest; they may avoid many of the administrative problems involved in selective subsidies. But they raise their own type of access problems. Even highly sophisticated social welfare systems (as in the UK) find difficulty in identifying those in most need and meeting their needs. Whatever the rules governing such systems, they may have the effect of excluding the poorest and 34 neediest, and of providing as much benefit to those administering the arrangements as to their clients. 
